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Why the “Single Entity” Defense Can 
Never Apply to NFL Clubs: 
A Primer on Property-Rights Theory  
in Professional Sports 
Marc Edelman* 
 
Over the past two decades, the National Football League 
(“NFL”) has become one of America’s most profitable collection 
of businesses.1  During this period the sum of NFL-club revenues 
has expanded from just under $970 million per year in 1989 to 
over $6.5 billion in 2008.2  NFL franchise values have also 
skyrocketed, with many clubs now valued at over $700 million per 
year.3 
 
A PDF version of this article is available online at http://law.fordham.edu/publications/ 
article.ihtml?pubID=200&id=2758.  Visit http://www.iplj.net for access to the complete 
Journal archive. 
* Marc Edelman, Esq. (MarcEdelman@aol.com) is a Sports Law professor at both 
New York Law School and Seton Hall University, as well as a Sports Law and 
Economics professor at Manhattanville College.  Mr. Edelman earned his B.S. in 
Economics from the Wharton School (University of Pennsylvania) and his J.D./M.A. 
from the University of Michigan. 
 1 See Don Walker, Longtime NFL Insider Goodell will Replace Tagliabue, 
MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Aug. 9, 2006, at C-Sports (“[Roger] Goodell is taking over an 
operation to be the best-run and most-popular sport in the country”), available at 2006 
WLNR 13770189; see also Kevin Paul Dupont, For Sports Franchises, the Loss Column 
Grows, THE BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 14, 2003, at A1 (discussing how the NFL is the only 
American professional sports league without imminent fiscal concerns); Tom Lowry, The 
NFL Machine, BUS. WK., Jan. 27, 2003, at 87–94; Manny Topol, A Super Commish, 
NEWSDAY, Jan. 26, 2003, at F6 (discussing the superior business performance of the 
NFL). 
 2 See Walker, supra note 1; see generally Lowry, supra note 1, at 89 (estimating NFL 
revenue at $4.8 billion in 2004). 
 3 Walker, supra note 1. 
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Clubs in the other three premier American sports leagues—
Major League Baseball (“MLB”), the National Basketball 
Association (“NBA”) and the National Hockey League (“NHL”)—
have also experienced strong revenue growth during this period, 
with the average rate-of-return for premier American sports clubs 
outpacing the overall U.S. stock market.4  This strong growth rate 
is based in part upon premier sports clubs’ unique property-rights 
structure, which allocates certain property rights at the league 
level, rather than at the club level.5 
In July 2007, the Northern District of Illinois ruled in American 
Needle Inc. v. New Orleans Saints that based on this unique 
property-rights structure, NFL clubs are exempt from certain 
aspects of § 1 of the Sherman Act, because “the NFL and the teams 
act as a single entity in their licensing and intellectual property.”6  
Since this ruling, other premier sports leagues have more broadly 
proclaimed that “professional sports leagues are best considered 
‘single entities’ under the antitrust laws” when assessing the 
leagues’ business practices.7 
 
 4 See Richard G. Sheehan, Keeping Score: The Economics of Big-Time Sports, in THE 
BUS. OF SPORTS 47, 47–49 (Scott R. Rosner & Kenneth L. Shropshire eds., 2004); see 
also RODNEY D. FORT, SPORTS ECONOMICS 6 (Prentice Hall 2d. ed. 2006) (during the 
1990s, club sale prices provided between 10.7 and 17.7 return on investment, depending 
upon sport); Lowry, supra note 1, at 87–93; Topol, supra note 1, at F6; Walker, supra 
note 2.  For articles specifically related to MLB, see Chris Isidore, Baseball Close to 
Catching NFL as Top $ Sport, CNNMONEY.COM (Oct. 25, 2007), available at 
http://money.cnn.com/2007/10/25/commentary/sportsbiz (explaining that Major League 
Baseball’s sales will surpass $6 billion for the first time in 2008, doubling the amount 
from 2000, and that “[b]aseball’s sales have increased 50 percent from 2004 and have 
doubled since 2000”); More Revenue for Major League Baseball, STREET & SMITH’S 
SPORTS BUS. J., Oct. 29, 2006, at 6 (discussing importance of MLB revenues exceeding 
$6 billion for the first time); Andrew Zimbalist, Baseball’s Fortunes are Soaring in More 
Ways than One, STREET & SMITH’S SPORTS BUS. J., Oct. 15, 2007, at 34. 
 5 See generally MICHAEL LEEDS & PETER VON ALLMEN, THE ECONOMICS OF SPORTS §§ 
3.1–3.4 (2002). 
 6 496 F. Supp. 2d 941, 943 (N.D. Ill. 2007).  Unusually, the court in American Needle 
based much of its holding on a single recent law review note. See id. (citing Nathaniel 
Grow, There’s No “I” in ‘League’: Professional Sports Leagues and the Single Entity 
Defense, 105 MICH. L. REV. 183 (2006)).  Further, the law review note relies on a dubious 
presumption that “there is minimal or nonexistent competition between franchises in a 
professional sports league.”  Grow, at 193. 
 7 Defendants’ Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion for 
Preliminary Injunction, Madison Square Garden, L.P. v. NHL, at 1 (Oct. 13, 2007) (No. 
07 Civ. 8455 (LAP)).  The Southern District of New York has since rejected this 
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As a matter of law and economics, courts should not find that 
premier American sports clubs are “single entities,” exempt from § 
1 of the Sherman Act.8  The Supreme Court defines “single 
entities” as 100%, wholly-owned companies,”9 or, at a minimum, 
companies with “complete unity of interest.”10  Leagues in the 
premier American sports are not 100% wholly-owned companies, 
nor do their constituent clubs have complete unity of interest.  
Therefore, as many courts have already concluded, these clubs are 
fully capable of conspiring with one another. 11 
 
argument. See Madison Square Garden, L.P. v. NHL, No. 07 Civ. 8455 (LAP), 2007 WL 
3254421, slip op. at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 2, 2007) (“The NHL is an unincorporated 
association of thirty Member Clubs organized as a joint venture.”) (citation omitted). 
 8 Section 1 of the Sherman Act states that “[e]very contract, combination . . . or 
conspiracy, in the restraint of trade . . . is declared to be illegal.” 26 Stat. 209 (1890) 
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–7 (2000)).  However, the Supreme Court has 
interpreted this statute to only illegalize those agreements that unreasonably restrain 
trade. Standard Oil v. U.S., 221 U.S. 1, 51 (1911).  Classification as a “single entity” 
means immunity under § 1 of the Sherman Act because it is impossible for an entity to 
collude with itself. Chi. Prof’l Sports Ltd. P’ship v. NBA (Chicago Bulls II), 95 F.3d 593, 
601 (7th Cir. 1996) (Cudahy, J. concurring). 
 9 Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 771 (1984).  “We 
limit our inquiry to the narrow issue squarely presented: whether a parent and its wholly 
owned subsidiary are capable of conspiring in violation of § 1 of the Sherman Act.” Id. at 
767. 
 10 Id. (internal citations omitted).  The Court then goes on to define “complete unity of 
interest” as occurring where the parties “objectives are common, not disparate,” as well 
as where the conduct “deprives the marketplace of the independent centers of 
decisionmaking that competition assumes.” Id. at 769, 771. 
 11 Many courts have rejected the single-entity defense in the scope of premier 
American sports leagues. See, e.g., St. Louis Convention & Visitors Comm’n v. NFL, 
154 F.3d 851 (8th Cir. 1998); Sullivan v. NFL, 34 F.3d 1091 (1st Cir. 1994); L.A. Mem’l 
Coliseum Comm’n v. NFL, 726 F.2d 1381 (9th Cir. 1984); Mid-South Grizzlies v. NFL, 
720 F.2d 772 (3d. Cir. 1983); N. Am. Soccer League v. NFL, 670 F.2d 1249 (2d Cir. 
1982); Shaw v. Dallas Cowboys Football Club, Ltd., No. 97 Civ 5184, 1998 WL 419765 
(E.D. Pa. June 23, 1998); McNeil v. NFL, 790 F. Supp. 871 (D. Minn. 1992); see 
generally Chicago Bulls II, 95 F.3d at 599 (“Whether the NBA itself is more like a single 
firm . . . or like a joint venture . . . is a tough question under Copperweld); Chi. Prof’l 
Sports Ltd. P’ship v. NBA (Chicago Bulls I), 961 F.2d 667, 673 (7th Cir. 1992) (“For 
now we treat the NBA as a joint venture, just as the parties do in the bulk of their 
arguments”); MICHAEL J. COZZILLIO ET. AL, SPORTS LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 11 (2d 
ed. 2007) (“Others perceive sports leagues and sports associations as types of joint 
ventures in which the parties operate as a collective but retain considerable individual 
entrepreneurial control.”); cf. Marc Edelman, Single Entity Ruling: ‘Needle’ in Haystack, 
N.Y.L.J. 4, 12 (Jan. 2, 2008) (discussing the American Needle ruling as an anomaly) 
[hereinafter Edelman, Single Entity Ruling]. 
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This article argues that as a matter of law and economics, clubs 
in the four premier American sports leagues lack sufficient unity of 
interest for any court to classify them as “single entities.”  Part I of 
this article discusses the contemporary law-and-economics theory 
underlying the allocation of private and common property.  Part II 
explains the three different property-rights systems that have 
emerged in American professional sports: (1) the pure private-
property system (no unity of interest); (2) the pure common-
property system (complete unity of interest); and (3) the mixed-
mode system (partial unity of interest).  Part III describes the 
contractual underpinnings of the mixed-mode property system, as 
that system applies to the four premier American sports leagues.  
Part IV analyzes the allocation of property rights in the mixed-
mode system and explains why sports clubs operating in that 
system cannot form a “single-entity” league. 
I. PRIVATE AND COMMON PROPERTY THEORY 
The central tenet of capitalism is personal ownership of 
property.12  Yet, even within capitalism, property owners often 
debate how to best allocate personal property rights.13  In a 
capitalist system, most property rights are held in private–either by 
an individual, a family, or a company.  Yet, other property rights 
are held in common: for example, by communes, kibbutzim, or 
cooperatives. 
Supporters of private property rights point to the 1833 
pamphlet by mathematician William Forster Lloyd, which explains 
 
 12 Property is a mixture of rights to use and exclude others from using. Chicago Bulls I, 
961 F.2d at 670.  The alternative to personal ownership is state ownership. See Harold 
Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, in PERSPECTIVES ON PROPERTY LAW 135, 
141 (Robert C. Ellickson, Carol M. Rose & Bruce A. Ackerman eds., 3d ed. 2002).  In a 
personal ownership system, “[a]n owner of property rights possesses the consent of 
fellowmen to allow him to act in [a] particular way[].” Id. at 136. 
 13 A number of authors have pointed out there really are three different kinds of 
personal property-private property, communal or jointly owned property, and “open 
access.” See James M. Acheson, The Lobster Gangs of Maine, in PERSPECTIVES OF 
PROPERTY LAW, supra note 12, at 129, 133. 
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the failings of the common property system.14  In his pamphlet, 
Lloyd explains that common property rights lead to overuse when 
too many owners have access to a given resource and nobody has 
the right to exclude others.15 
Lloyd’s theory was later adopted by Garrett Hardin in his well-
known 1968 article, The Tragedy of the Commons.16  In that 
article, Hardin explains the tragedy of common property in terms 
of the perverse incentive to overuse.17  The incentive to overuse, 
according to Hardin, comes from the notion that each user reaps 
the full economic benefit from additional use; however, each user 
only suffers a fraction of the associated cost.18 
 
 14 See, e.g., Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, in PERSPECTIVES OF 
PROPERTY LAW, supra note 12, at 119, 120. 
 15 See id.; see also Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter 
Innovation? The Anticommons in Biomedical Research, in PERSPECTIVES OF PROPERTY 
LAW, supra note 12, at 159, 160. 
 16 See generally Hardin, in PERSPECTIVES OF PROPERTY LAW, supra note 12. 
 17 See generally id. 
 18 Hardin explains: 
As a rational being, each herdsman seeks to maximize his gain.  
Explicitly or implicitly, more or less consciously, he asks, “What is 
the utility to me of adding one more animal to my herd?”  This utility 
has one negative and one positive component. 
1. The positive component is a function of the increment of one 
animal.  Since the herdsman receives all the proceeds from the 
sale of the additional animal, the positive utility is nearly +1. 
2. The negative component is a function of the additional 
overgrazing created by one more animal.  Since, however, the 
effects of overgrazing are shared by all the herdsmen, the 
negative utility for any particular decision-making herdsman is 
only a fraction of -1. 
3. Adding together the component partial utilities, the rational 
herdsman concludes that the only sensible course for him to 
pursue is to add another animal to his herd.  And another; and 
another . . . . But this is the conclusion reached by each and 
every rational herdsman sharing a commons.  Therein is the 
tragedy.  Each man is locked into a system that compels him to 
increase his herd without limit—in a world that is limited. 
Id. at 120.  In another renowned article, Harold Demsetz explains the same common 
property problem as a difficulty ensuring that a transaction’s beneficiary also bears the 
transaction’s cost. See Demsetz, in PERSPECTIVES OF PROPERTY LAW, supra note 12, at 
141. 
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Similar to the “tragedy of the commons,” common-property 
systems may also lead to the opposite problem, referred to by 
Michael Heller as “the tragedy of the anticommons.”19  In this 
tragedy, a resource is prone to under-use because multiple owners 
each have a right to exclude others.20  Hence, no common owner 
reaps any benefit.21 
Despite these “tragedies,” many property-law scholars remain 
enthusiastic about the prospects of common property systems as 
enhancing group performance.22  For example, James Acheson, in 
his article The Lobster Gangs of Maine, points to specific profit-
enhancing mechanisms of the Maine lobstermen’s common 
property system.23  According to Acheson, under the Maine 
arrangement, individual lobstermen choose to join “harbor gangs,” 
which share common property amongst themselves.24  For these 
“harbor gangs,” the value added by working collectively is that 
members obtain valuable information about fishing locations and 
innovations from one another.25  Members also assist one another 
in times of emergency at sea.26 
Today, property scholars continue to debate the conditions for 
successful common property systems, recognizing that identical 
arrangements do not best allocate property rights in all 
circumstances.  Ellickson, for example, has repeatedly suggested 
that common ownership succeeds when business endeavors are 
risky because common ownership allows pooling and sharing of 
risk.27  Meanwhile, in the 1992 article Common Property, 
Collective Action and Community, authors Sara Singleton and 
 
 19 Michael Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons, 111 HARV. L. REV. 621, 642 
(1998); see also HELLER & EISENBERG, in PERSPECTIVES OF PROPERTY LAW, supra note 
12, at 160–61. 
 20 See Heller & Eisenberg, in PERSPECTIVES OF PROPERTY LAW, supra note 12, at 161. 
 21 See id.  An example of this tragedy occurred in post-Soviet economies, where 
storefronts remained empty as salesmen continued to sell goods on the street because the 
right to use storefronts was held in common by all citizens. See id. 
 22 See infra notes 24–27 and accompanying text. 
 23 See Acheson, in PERSPECTIVES OF PROPERTY LAW, supra note 12, at 129–34. 
 24 See id. at 133. 
 25 Id. at 130. 
 26 Id. 
 27 Robert C. Ellickson, Property in Land, in PERSPECTIVES OF PROPERTY LAW, supra 
note 12, at 146, 156. 
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Michael Taylor suggest that common-property ownership succeeds 
where there is appropriate restraint or regulation of use.28  
According to Singleton and Taylor, proper restraint or regulation 
could occur where four communal factors co-exist: shared beliefs 
among owners; an ownership set that is more-or-less stable; 
owners that expect to continue interacting; and direct, multiplex 
communication.29  Conversely, factors adverse to common 
property arrangements include differences amongst property 
owners in wealth, income, race, ethnicity, religion, or class.30  
Based on certain differences amongst these factors, in the context 
of American professional sports, property-rights holders have 
considered a wide array of allocation alternatives along the private-
versus-common property spectrum. 
II. THE THREE PROPERTY SYSTEMS IN AMERICAN SPORTS 
From a general business perspective, there are three ways that 
American professional sports could allocate property rights: (1) the 
club-based private property system (no unity of interest); (2) the 
league-based common property system (complete unity of 
interest); and (3) the mixed-mode property system (partial unity of 
interest). 
A. Rise and Fall of the Club-Based Private Property System 
The first system used to allocate property rights in American 
sports was the club-based private property system.31  During this 
early period, which lasted until the mid-1870s, all clubs were 
privately owned, privately operated, and minimally cooperative 
 
 28 See Sara Singleton & Michael Taylor, Common Property, Collective Action and 
Community, 4 J. THEORETICAL POL. 309, 310 (1992). 
 29 See id. at 315. 
 30 See id. at 316. 
 31 See Symposium, Panel III: Restructuring Professional Sports Leagues, 12 FORDHAM 
INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 413, 419 (2002) [hereinafter Panel III] (“[O]riginally 
sports in America, especially the team sports, started off as individual clubs.”) (citing 
Gregor Lentze, The Legal Concept of Professional Sports Leagues: The Commissioner 
and an Alternate Approach from a Corporate Perspective, 6 MARQ. SPORTS L.J. 65, 66 
(1995)); see also LEEDS & VON ALLMEN, supra note 5, at 93. 
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with one another.32  Sports clubs played each other exclusively on 
an informal basis, and visiting games occurred during long road 
trips known as “grand tour[s].”33 
Baseball was the most popular sport during this era, featuring 
over 300 independent clubs.  The nation’s best clubs drew large 
crowds, as fans expected to see which undefeated clubs would 
remain undefeated.34  During this era, players formed organizations 
such as the National Association of Base Ball Players (“NABBP”), 
which purported to standardize on-the-field rules.35  These 
associations, however, neither enforced off-the-field rules nor 
crowned a league champion.36 
Within a short time, it became obvious that there were many 
problems with the club-based private property system.  For 
example, because independent clubs contracted to play games 
against rivals without any centralized oversight, each club played a 
different length schedule, against a different set of opponents.37  As 
a result, when a club such as the Cincinnati Red Stockings finished 
its 1869 season with the remarkable record of 56 wins, 0 losses and 
one tie, fans were left wondering if that club was really amongst 
the best, or whether the club merely chose not compete against 
high-caliber competition.38 
One of the main impediments to fielding more baseball 
contests during this era involved high transaction costs.39  In 
addition to causing scheduling problems, high transaction costs 
caused high club turnover, disagreement amongst clubs about how 
to allocate game proceeds, a lacking of competitive balance, and a 
rampant gambling problem among players and managers.40 
Due to the severity of these problems, by the 1870s, the club-
based private property system, which featured entirely private 
 
 32 See generally LEEDS & VON ALLMEN, supra note 5, at 93. 
 33 See GERALD W. SCULLY, THE MARKET STRUCTURE OF SPORTS 5 (1995). 
 34 See LEEDS & VON ALLMEN, supra note 5, at 93. 
 35 See SCULLY, supra note 33, at 5. 
 36 See id. at 5–6. 
 37 See id. at 6. 
 38 LEEDS & VON ALLMEN, supra note 5, at 93. 
 39 See SCULLY, supra note 33, at 6. 
 40 See id. at 7. 
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property rights, was in a decline.41  A major blow to the system 
came in 1876, when Chicago baseball promoter William Hubert 
launched what most regarded as a superior baseball product: 
National League baseball.42  Although the National League did not 
initially reallocate many property rights, the emergence of even a 
basic league structure encouraged clubs to cooperate with one 
another.43  For example, one of the National League’s first 
accomplishments was to establish a standardized playing 
schedule.44  The National League also implemented a three-person 
panel to resolve a narrow range of disputes amongst club owners.45 
Then, in 1920 (seventeen years after the National League 
unofficially merged with the American League),46 the National and 
American Leagues jointly named Judge Kenesaw Mountain Landis 
as Major League Baseball’s first commissioner.47  By creating the 
position of commissioner, ordained with broad authority to 
investigate alleged wrongdoing and to punish any conduct 
suspected as “detrimental to the best interests of the national game 
of baseball,” Major League Baseball began to usher in a new 
system of sports, marked by some central coordination of property 
rights.48  Nevertheless, it is important to remember that “it was the 
leagues that were created to direct the success of the individual 
[clubs],” and not the other way around.49 
 
 41 See id. at 6–7. 
 42 See id.; see also Marc Edelman, Can Antitrust Law Save the Minnesota Twins? Why 
Commissioner Selig’s Contraction Plan was Never a Sure Deal, 10 SPORTS LAW J. 45, 47 
(2003) [hereinafter Edelman, Minnesota Twins]. 
 43 See SCULLY, supra note 33, at 7–8, 12. 
 44 Cf. LEEDS & VON ALLMEN, supra note 5, at 93. 
 45 ANDREW ZIMBALIST, BEST INTERESTS OF BASEBALL? THE REVOLUTIONARY REIGN OF 
BUD SELIG 22 (2006). 
 46 See Edelman, Minnesota Twins, supra note 42, at 47. 
 47 Jason M. Pollack, Take My Arbitrator, Please: Commissioner “Best Interests” 
Disciplinary Authority in Professional Sports, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 1645, 1646 (1999). 
 48 Id. (citing Major League Agreement §2(a)–(b), at 1 (1921)). 
 49 Panel III, supra note 31, at 420 (quoting Kenneth Shropshire); see also L.A. Mem’l 
Coliseum Comm’n v. NFL, 726 F.2d 1381, 1389 (9th Cir. 1984) (“Even though the 
individual clubs often act for the common good of the NFL, we must not lose sight of the 
purpose of the NFL as stated in Article I of its constitution, which is to ‘promote and 
foster the primary business of League members.’”); Daniel S. Mason, Revenue Sharing 
and Agency Problems in Professional Team Sport: The Case of the National Football 
League, in THE BUSINESS OF SPORTS, supra note 4, 54, 55 (“[T]eams collectively hire a 
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B. Rise and Fall of the League-Based Common Property System 
On the opposite end of the spectrum, another property rights 
system that emerged in American sports was the league-based 
common property system, which began in the 1990s with the aid of 
sophisticated lawyers.50  The league-based common property 
system consists of a centrally-held league that holds all property 
rights collectively.51 
The most important example of this common property system 
is the original model for Major League Soccer (“MLS”), which 
was created in the early 1990s by then Latham & Watkins LLP 
attorney Alan Rothenberg.52  Mr. Rothenberg envisioned MLS to 
serve as a “single entity” league for purposes of an antitrust 
advantage.53  At least in the business sector, this model seemed to 
meet the Sherman Act’s test for “complete unity of interest.”54 
The MLS model, as envisioned by Rothenberg, was intended to 
serve as a league composed of “investor-operators” (rather than 
club owners) financing and operating an entire soccer entity under 
a single voice.55  These investors, according to Rothenberg’s 
original plan, were to own  shares of the league entity and sit on a 
Board of Directors.56  The Board of Directors would then elect 
 
commissioner to oversee League operations and to temper any disputes that may arise 
among League stakeholders.”). 
 50 See COZZILLIO ET AL., supra note 11, at 26; PAUL C. WEILER & GARY R. ROBERTS, 
SPORTS AND THE LAW: TEXT, CASES AND PROBLEMS 214–15, 566 (3d ed. 2004). 
 51 See Lacie Kaiser, The Flight from Single-Entity Structured Leagues, 2 DEPAUL J. OF 
SPORTS L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1, 1 (2004) (explaining that centrally-held leagues have 
“tried to centralize and control their respective sports by having the league own all teams, 
hold all player and coaching contracts and pay those salaries, and maintain sponsorship 
deals and broadcasting rights.”). 
 52 WEILER & ROBERTS, supra note 50, at 566; see also Alan I. Rothenberg—Profile, 
FORBES, http://www.forbes.com/finance/mktguideapps/personinfo/FromPersonIdPerson 
Tearsheet.jhtml?passedPersonId=939747 (last visited Jan. 28, 2008). 
 53 See WEILER & ROBERTS, supra note 50, at 214, 566. 
 54 Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 771 (1984); see 
WEILER & ROBERTS, supra note 50, at 214. 
 55 WEILER & ROBERTS, supra note 50, at 214.  These club operators, who make the day-
to-day business decisions for a single club, were awarded with a pro rata share of overall 
league profits, rather than with the profits of that specific club. See id. at 566. 
 56 Id.; see also Kaiser, supra note 51, at 8–9 (“In 1995, Major League Soccer (MLS) 
began its first season formed as a limited liability company under Delaware law.  At first, 
a board of governors of the MLS had centralized control over the league and all of its 
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officers to run all of the clubs’ business operations in a unified 
manner, centrally–setting prices for tickets, concessions, and 
broadcasting, as well as hiring and assigning personnel.57  
According to Rothenberg’s original plan, once the league paid its 
corporate taxes, the remaining revenues would be reinvested into 
the league, and any profits the league earned would be distributed 
equally to league shareholders in the form of dividends.58  Thus, all 
owners would earn an equal return per share, irrespective of each 
clubs’ on-the-field performance—a factor completely unifying all 
shareholders’ interests.59 
At first glance, Rothenberg’s proposed common-property 
system should have attracted strong investor interest.  The 
purported financial advantages of the MLS’s common property 
system were based upon reducing shareholder risk.  Specifically, 
the league structure, as proposed by Rothenberg, would have 
enjoyed lower operating expenses than other sports structures 
based on the need for fewer front-office functional and 
administrative employees.60 
Nevertheless, MLS’s pure common-property system never 
came into fruition, as most prospective shareholders were 
disinterested in the proposed league structure.61  As a general 
matter, wealthy investors did not want to become “faceless 
 
teams.  The board was to run all of the teams; handle all player contracts and allocation; 
employ all coaches, general managers, and staff; and set prices for concessions, 
broadcasts, merchandise, and tickets.”). 
 57 WEILER & ROBERTS, supra note 50, at 566. 
 58 See id.  The MLS quickly abandoned this purely common-property model in favor of 
an organization involving investor-operators, which played some role in determining the 
day-to-day business decisions of a specific club and maintained some of the relevant 
profits. Id. at 566–67. 
 59 See generally id. at 566. 
 60 See id.; see also COZZILLIO ET AL., supra note 11, at 27 (“Beyond the advantages of 
substantially reduced antitrust exposure and liability, the [common-property] league 
should yield cost savings associated with reduced competition. . . . There also may be . . . 
cost savings as a result of [the common-property league] being responsible for the 
business operations of all the teams in the league.”). 
 61 See COZZILLIO ET AL., supra note 11, at 17 (“On one hand, it is unlikely that most 
team owners would be willing to trade their individual operating autonomy and the 
historical, well-nurtured inter-franchise rivalries.”); WEILER & ROBERTS, supra note 50, 
at 566. 
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investors” in a sports corporation.62  Rather, they wanted the 
chance to win championships.63  Because the pure common-
property system did not produce champion owners, few were 
interested in investing in MLS.64 
Because of difficulty initially finding investors, MLS 
eventually abandoned its pure common-property structure and 
turned to a mixed-mode model.65  Ultimately, MLS chose a 
property-rights system more to the liking of potential investors, but 
where “‘complete unity of interest[]’”66 became “doubtful.”67  In 
other words, the “single entity” structure was cast aside.68 
Since then, only a few start-up sports businesses have 
attempted to revive the pure common-property system.  In 2000-
2001, World Wrestling Entertainment (“WWE”) attempted to form 
a common-property league when it launched a new professional 
football league called the XFL, of which 75 percent of the league 
was owned by the publicly-traded WWE; however, the XFL folded 
 
 62 WEILER & ROBERTS, supra note 50, at 566. 
 63 See id.; see also Panel III, supra note 31, at 424 (“Most problematic for the single-
entity structure is figuring out how to tell the large-ego set of owners that this league is 
going to be a little bit different and that as a single entity, one of the owners, like George 
Steinbrenner or Jerry Buss, will not have the opportunity to be out front in the same 
manner that previous leagues have had individual owners out front.”) (quoting Kenneth 
Shropshire). 
 64 See COZZILLIO ET AL., supra note 11, at 22 (“By permitting individual owners to run 
the local business operations of their teams, the major sports leagues have been able to 
attract wealthy entrepreneurs who are capable of operating their individual teams, while, 
at the same time, providing experience, oversight, and expertise to the overall league 
operations.”) (citations omitted); WEILER & ROBERTS, supra note 50, at 567 (explaining 
that “in the end, MLS had to make a radical change to give [potential owner Robert] 
Kraft, for example, special status as ‘investor operator’ of the New England Revolution, 
wielding much the same control over this club as his Patriots.”). 
 65 See WEILER & ROBERTS, supra note 50, at 566–67. 
 66 Fraser v. Major League Soccer, 284 F.3d 47, 57 (1st Cir. 2002) (quoting Copperweld 
Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 771 (1984)). 
 67 Fraser, 284 F.3d at 58–59 (“To sum up, the present case is not Copperweld but 
presents a more doubtful situation; MLS and its operator/investors comprise a hybrid 
arrangement, somewhere between a single company (with or without wholly owned 
subsidiaries) and a cooperative arrangement between existing competitors. . . . The case 
for expanding Copperweld is debatable and, more so, the case for applying the single 
entity label to MLS.”); see also Copperweld, 467 U.S. at 771. 
 68 See Kaiser, supra note 51, at 1–2 (explaining that the MLS has since “moved 
towards the more traditional structure of individually owned teams with a league office to 
oversee those teams”). 
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after just one season.69  Also in 2001, the Major Indoor Soccer 
League (“MISL”) launched itself as a single-entity indoor soccer 
league based on a system of common property rights.70  The MISL 
has proven more successful than the XFL, having just recently 
signed a multiyear television deal with the Fox Soccer Channel.71  
Only time will tell if the MISL keeps its single-entity structure.72 
C. Mixed-Mode Property System: A Superior Sports Alternative 
Given that the private-property system has led to sub-optimally 
low levels of cooperation, and the common-property system has 
struggled to lure investors, most sports businesses have converged 
upon a middle-ground solution that includes both private and 
commonly-held property rights.73  This new approach, in 
economics terms, is best described as a “mixed-mode” system. 74  
It is a middle-ground system of allocating property rights, and it is 
 
 69 See Langdon Brockinton, Selling Market on New Property a Challenge; XFL Half 
Way There, STREET & SMITH’S SPORTS BUS. J., Dec. 4, 2000, at 3; see also Marc 
Edelman, Fan Ownership can Give UFL a Leg up on Building Loyalty, STREET & 
SMITH’S SPORTS BUS. J., Aug. 27, 2007, at 28 [hereinafter Edelman, Fan Ownership]; Jon 
Show, WWE Busy Scripting its Next Moves, STREET & SMITH’S SPORTS BUS. J., Oct. 9, 
2006, at 28. 
 70 See One on One with Steve Ryan, Major Indoor Soccer League Commissioner, 
STREET & SMITH’S SPORTS BUS. J., Feb. 9, 2004, at 42; David Sweet, TV Deal Key to 
Indoor Soccer Goal of Becoming Fifth Major League, STREET & SMITH’S SPORTS BUS. J., 
Mar. 18, 2002, at 22. 
 71 See Colin Stephenson, Indoor Soccer Team Set to Play in Prudential Center, THE 
STAR-LEDGER, June 20, 2007, at 59, available at 2007 WLNR 11564594 (“Asked why he 
chose to add a soccer team to the 17,500-seat arena’s list of tenants, [New Jersey Devils 
owner Jeff] Vanderbeek said he thinks the league’s financial model [a single-entity 
ownership structure with a $350,000 salary cap per team] will make it possible to turn a 
profit.  He also said he simply liked the game, and thought it would be a good fit for the 
area.”); see also Dancy Named Sharks Head Coach, ORLANDO BUS. J., Sept. 25, 2007, 
available at 2007 WLNR 18790693; Terry Lefton, Puma to Make Balls for MISL, 
STREET & SMITH’S SPORTS BUS. J., Oct. 9, 2006, at 8; Major Indoor Soccer League, 
HOOVERS COMPANY IN-DEPTH REPS., Mar. 28, 2007, available at 2007 WLNR 5843454; 
MISL Signs TV Deal, STREET & SMITH’S SPORTS BUS. J., Oct. 15, 2007, at 7. 
 72 The author of this article was affiliated with the MISL during the summer of 2001. 
 73 COZZILLIO ET AL., supra note 11, at 11 (stating that sports leagues operate as a joint 
venture but retain considerable individual control). 
 74 See Richard C. Levin et al., The Report of the Independent Members of the 
Commissioner’s Blue Ribbon Panel on Baseball Economics, in THE BUSINESS OF SPORTS, 
supra note 4, 62, 64 (“[S]ports leagues are blends of cooperation and competition—
cooperation for the sake of producing satisfactory competitiveness.”). 
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the system currently in place by all four of the premier American 
sports leagues.75 
From a strategic perspective, a mixed-mode property system is 
composed of individual club owners that recognize some 
cooperation amongst clubs is needed to produce a saleable 
output.76  For example, all clubs in the mixed-mode system accept 
the need to maintain at least one viable opponent,77 and all clubs 
want to maintain at least minimal leveling of on-the-field 
competition.78  In addition, although each club in the mixed-mode 
system generally prefers to win, no club wants to always beat its 
opponents.79  This is a critical distinction, as clubs in the mixed-
mode system understand that fans do not want to attend a 
seemingly pre-determined contest.80 
At the same time, however, clubs in the mixed-mode system 
still seek to maintain some independent property rights apart from 
any central planning.81  Because the interests of individual clubs 
 
 75 See COZZILLIO ET AL., supra note 11, at 19–25.  For this reason, one of the leading 
treatises on sports law refers to the mixed-mode property system simply as the 
“traditional model.” Id. 
 76 PAUL DOWNWARD & ALISTAIR DAWSON, THE ECONOMICS OF PROFESSIONAL CLUB 
SPORTS 20 (2000); see also COZZILLIO ET AL., supra note 11, at 11 (“Unlike individual 
sports events, which may survive on their own, teams in most league sports, excepting, of 
course, barnstorming operations such as the Harlem Globetrotters, need a league or some 
sort of contractual relationship with other teams to exist.”). 
 77 E.g., N. Am. Soccer League v. NFL, 670 F.2d 1249, 1251 (2d Cir. 1982) (“No single 
owner could engage in professional football for profit without at least one other 
competing team.”); see also DOWNWARD & DAWSON, supra note 76, at 20. 
 78 See DOWNWARD & DAWSON, supra note 77, at 21 (citation omitted). 
 79 See id. at 20; see also COZZILLIO ET AL., supra note 11, at 11 (“One aspect of this 
business cooperation is an effort to control the economic competition among the teams to 
ensure that there will be some degree of parity.”). 
 80 See COZZILLIO ET AL., supra note 11, at 11; DOWNWARD & DAWSON, supra note 76, 
at 25; see generally John Lombardo, XFL Revamps Strategy as Ratings Dive, STREET & 
SMITH’S SPORTS BUS. J., Mar. 5, 2001, at 4 (explaining that unlike in World Wrestling 
Entertainment, the owners of the XFL cannot script game action). 
 81 See Chicago Bulls II, 95 F.3d 593, 597 (7th Cir. 1996) (“The teams are not the 
league’s subsidiaries; they have separate ownership.”); COZZILLIO ET AL., supra note 11, 
at 11 (“In some respects these leagues and associations are not unlike large cartels (such 
as OPEC), having a common goal and objective that is best obtained through collective 
efforts, yet resulting in individual gains not necessarily shared with other members of the 
cartel.”) (citations omitted); see also Complaint for Injunction Relief at ¶ 12 Madison 
Square Garden, L.P. v. NHL, No. 07 Civ. 8455 (Sept. 28, 2007) (“Over the years, MSG 
has developed, reinforced and encouraged fan interest in the Rangers, making substantial 
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are not identically aligned, clubs in larger markets generally prefer 
to keep more private property;82 whereas clubs in the smaller 
markets generally prefer more collectivization.83  Nevertheless, all 
clubs in the mixed-mode system recognize an ultimate need to 
balance these two preferences. 
As a result, a dimorphic property-rights structure emerges in 
the mixed-mode commons, equipped with tightened controls on 
clubs in comparison to the private-property model, as well as a 
greater emphasis on controls that are enforced by the clubs acting 
jointly.84  This innovative structure is facilitated by the National 
Labor Relations Board (“NLRB”) mandate that the league overall 
serve as the exclusive bargaining unit for the purposes of collective 
bargaining.85 
III. CONTRACTUAL UNDERPINNINGS OF THE MIXED-MODE 
PROPERTY SYSTEM 
The relationship between clubs in the mixed-mode property 
system is set forth by two important agreements: (1) the league 
constitution (or league agreement), which sets forth the 
 
investments in the Rangers franchise as it seeks to compete with other NHL teams, 
including but not limited to the two other NHL teams in the New York metropolitan 
area.”) (emphasis added). 
 82 See DOWNWARD & DAWSON, supra note 76, at 37–38; see also Ken Rosenthal, 
Angelos’ Game Plan Puts Owners in the Ballpark, THE BALTIMORE SUN, July 28, 1994, 
at 1C (explaining that Peter “Angelos [owner of MLB’s Baltimore Orioles] opposes 
revenue sharing because it would shift some of the Orioles’ profits to teams generating 
less revenues—in effect, penalizing his club for achieving financial success”); Vito 
Stellino, Cowboys’ Jones Wins Again; Revenue Sharing Remains Unchanged, THE 
BALTIMORE SUN, Feb. 10, 1996, at 10C (discussing the NFL’s Dallas Cowboys’ 
opposition to significant revenue sharing). 
 83 See DOWNWARD & DAWSON, supra note 75, at 37–38; see also Jack O’Connell, 
Following his Lead: Selig has Skippered Sport through Changes, Strike, THE HARTFORD 
COURANT, Mar. 31, 2002, at L2. 
 84 See generally COZZILLIO ET AL., supra note 11, at 11–12, 23 (discussing these 
compromises and the increased economic interdependence of clubs in the modern 
model); cf. L.A. Mem’l Coliseum Comm’n v. NFL, 726 F.2d 1381, 1389 (9th Cir. 1984) 
(“NFL policies are not set by one individual or parent corporation, but by the separate 
teams acting jointly.”). 
 85 See, e.g., N. Am. Soccer League v. NLRB, 613 F.2d 1379 (5th Cir. 1980) (holding 
that the NLRB did not err in determining that the appropriate bargaining unit was the 
league overall). 
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relationship between individual clubs, and (2) the collective 
bargaining agreement, which sets forth the relationship between 
clubs and the players union.86  Pursuant to these two contracts, 
clubs in the mixed-mode system hire a league commissioner to 
oversee and coordinate certain collective behavior among the 
clubs, as well as institute detailed rules governing the entry and 
exit of clubs from the league.87 
A. The Commissioner 
The league commissioner is a central administrator whose 
broad-based responsibility in overseeing the behavior of 
independent competitors serves as “an ‘exception,’ an ‘anomaly,’ 
and an ‘aberration’”88 within the more generalized world of 
American business.89  In pro sports, the commissioner is 
responsible for overseeing the collective conduct of sports clubs; 
yet, according to most courts, the commissioner is autonomous, 
rather than an agent of any given club.90 
The commissioner has great power to help align the financial 
interests of individual clubs by enforcing general financial rules, 
 
 86 See COZZILLIO ET AL., supra note 11, at 11 (“Most leagues are coalesced by some 
type of multi-team agreement in which each member agrees to observe a common set of 
by-laws and/or constitutional provisions.  In essence, the wax that binds the members is a 
form of contract in which all teams agree to defer to the rules of the league as a whole.”); 
see also L.A. Mem’l Coliseum Comm’n, 726 F.2d at 1387 (“How the NFL is organized 
and the nature and extent of cooperation among the member clubs is a matter of record; 
the NFL Constitution and Bylaws contain the agreement.”). 
 87 See Pollack, supra note 47, at 1647–49, 1676; see generally COZZILIO ET AL., supra 
note 11, at 11 (explaining the role of league bylaws). 
 88 Finley & Co. v. Kuhn, 569 F.2d 527, 536 (7th Cir. 1978) (citing Flood v. Kuhn 407 
U.S. 258, 282 (1972)). 
 89 Id. at 537 (7th Cir. 1978) (“In no other . . . business is there quite the same system, 
created for quite the same reasons and with quite the same underlying policies.”); see 
generally Pollack, supra note 47, at 1647–48. 
 90 See, e.g., Rose v. Giamatti, 721 F. Supp. 906, 919 (1989) (“Whatever other activity 
the Commissioner may be authorized to perform as an agent on behalf of Major League 
Baseball, it is clear that with regard to disciplinary matters, the major league baseball 
clubs have made the Commissioner totally independent of their control.  Under the Major 
League Agreement, the Commissioner’s status with respect to disciplinary matters is 
analogous to that of an independent contractor . . . independent of any control by the 
members of Major League Baseball.”). But cf. Prof’l Hockey Corp. v. World Hockey 
Ass’n, 143 Cal. App. 3d 410, 415–16 (1983) (applying a fiduciary duty to club owners 
that sit on the Board of Trustees of a league). 
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such as asset-to-liability rules.91  The commissioner also plays an 
important role in helping to unify sports clubs regarding non-
financial issues.92  For example, early in the history of the mixed-
mode system, the commissioner helped to implement standardized 
rules to promote player safety and welfare, such as the requirement 
that baseball, football, and now hockey players wear helmets.93  
More recently, the commissioner has helped to establish 
standardized drug-testing policies, as well as other general rules 
related to player and club decorum.94 
B. Limited Entry of New Clubs 
In terms of defining the rules of new membership, the mixed-
mode property system allows only a limited number of new clubs 
to join each league—a feature that requires individual club voting 
to determine potential league expansion.95  From an economics 
perspective, admitting new clubs into an established league has 
both a positive and negative effects on existing members.96  For 
existing clubs, the advantage of new entry is that the new entrants 
must pay an admission fee to each of the existing clubs.97  The 
amount of this fee may include a substantial premium above the 
current estimated mean franchise value.  For example, in 2000, the 
Houston Texans paid $700 million to join the NFL, even though 
the highest sale price of an existing NFL franchise at that time was 
just $635 million.98 
 
 91 For example, in 1982, MLB clubs owners introduced the “60/40 rule,” which states 
that a MLB club must maintain a ratio of assets and liabilities of at least 60 to 40; the 
MLB commissioner is responsible for enforcing that rule. Andrew Zimbalist, MLB’s 
Debt Rule Reveals More Smoke and Mirrors, STREET & SMITH’S SPORTS BUS. J., May 3, 
2004, at 27; MLB CONST., art. XI, § 1 (amend. 2005) (addressing Fiscal Responsibility 
[hereinafter MLB CONST.]. 
 92 See generally WEILER & ROBERTS, supra note 50, at 30–32. 
 93 See LEEDS & VON ALLMEN, supra note 5, at 96. 
 94 See generally WEILER & ROBERTS, supra note 50, at 49–51. 
 95 See generally L.A. Mem’l Coliseum Comm’n v. NFL, 726 F.2d 1381, 1389 (9th Cir. 
1984) (explaining these type of league policies are not set by one parent club but rather 
“by the separate teams acting jointly”). 
 96 LEEDS & VON ALLMEN, supra note 5, at 102–03. 
 97 Id. at 103. 
 98 See John McClain, Capers Likely Texans’ Choice: First Coach could be Named 
Soon, THE HOUSTON CHRONICLE, Jan. 18, 2001, at 1; see also FORT, supra note 4, at 7 
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The negative aspect of new entry is that new entry leads to the 
need to allocate risk among more parties.99  Also, in leagues that 
share significant revenues, entrance of new, financially unstable 
clubs could seriously undermine the stability of the league as a 
whole.100 
Because the mixed-mode system is really nothing more than a 
loosely-aligned union of clubs, entry of any new club into an 
existing league requires the vote of existing club owners.  MLB, 
for example, requires “[t]he vote of three-fourths of the Major 
League Clubs . . . for the approval of . . . expansion by the addition 
of a new Club or Clubs.”101  Although in most other contexts MLB 
votes are decided by a mere majority, MLB enforces a heightened 
voting standard in the context of entry, because MLB clubs 
recognize the need to be extra careful; this ensures new clubs are 
reputable.102 
When clubs vote on entry, existing clubs consider various 
factors about who to select as new ownership.  Clubs always seek 
to exclude buyers that lack financial resources to amply invest in 
 
(mentioning that the New York Jets set an NFL record price when the club was sold in 
2000 for $635 million). 
 99 Cf. COZZILLIO ET AL., supra note 11, at 24. 
 100 See id. (“A collateral business concern faced . . . concerns the situation of a member 
club whose owner is in severe financial distress, whether that distress is caused by the 
club’s performance or unrelated financial problems.  The business of the team may be 
severely disrupted as the owner seeks a solution to his or her financial problems.”); 
Richard Alm, Big Chill Ahead in the NHL?, THE DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Feb. 1, 2003, 
at 1B; see generally Mid-South Grizzlies v. NFL, 720 F.2d 772 (3rd. Cir. 1983) 
(Memphis Grizzlies football franchise in the defunct World Football League 
unsuccessfully sued for entrance into the NFL).  Note, however, that other, less legitimate 
reasons for steep entry fees may stem from purported advantages to keeping the number 
of teams in the league below the market rate to ensure premium pricing on franchise 
sales, as well a local government funding for new stadiums. See Marc Edelman, How to 
Curb Professional Sports’ Bargaining Power Vis-à-Vis the American City, VA. SPORTS & 
ENT. L.J. 280, 290 (2003) (“Modern sports leagues maintain excessive demand by 
keeping a supply of viable host cities on hold so that current host cities, absent long-term 
agreements with teams, are always in the position of having to accept a team owners’ 
demands or else risk losing that team.”) (internal citations omitted) [hereinafter Edelman, 
Curb Bargaining Power]. 
 101 MLB CONST., art. V, § 2(b)–2(b)(1). 
 102 See COZZILLIO ET AL., supra note 11, at 24 (“[E]very member club may be adversely 
affected by commercial and public relations errors committed by a single member 
club.”). 
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their clubs, as well as buyers with controversial character traits.103  
On occasion, leagues have also sought to exclude sales to 
prospective owners for less socially acceptable reasons, such as 
their ethnicity or sociopolitical views.104 
Finally, of note, among the four premier American sports 
leagues, NFL clubs impose the strictest restrictions on potential 
new ownership.  In addition to excluding certain prospective 
owners based on financial resources and character traits, the NFL 
also seeks to prevent the sale of clubs to corporate buyers and 
public buyers (with a special exception for the Green Bay 
Packers).105  The NFL also has sought to forbid any ownership 
structure where the primary investor in a club would own less than 
51% of that club, as well as any cross-ownership arrangement 
where the primary investor would own an interest in another sports 
team.106  This last league rule has been found unlawful in at least 
one instance; however, it has not been removed from the league 
bylaws.107 
C. Potential for Exit of Existing Clubs 
Beyond governing entry, mixed-mode sports leagues also 
establish rules governing club exit.108  One way that leagues 
govern exit is by requiring an affirmative vote among clubs before 
 
 103 Cf. Piazza and Tirendi v. MLB, 831 F.Supp. 420, 422 (E.D. Pa. 1993). 
 104 In the early 1990s, two prospective buyers of the San Francisco Giants contended 
that the MLB denied their bid to purchase a baseball club based on their Italian-American 
heritage. See id. at 422–23.  Similarly, world-famous baseball owner Bill Veeck contends 
that in 1944 he was denied the opportunity to purchase the Philadelphia Phillies baseball 
club because he intended to break the race barrier in baseball, stocking the club entirely 
with African-American players. BILL VEECK & ED LINN, VEECK AS IN WRECK 171–72 
(Univ. Chi. Press 2001). 
 105 See Packers.com, Team: Executive Committee, http://www.packers.com/team/ 
executive_committee (last visited Feb. 7, 2008) (“[T]he Green Bay Packers are a team 
and an organization unique in both structure and accomplishment. They represent—from 
an organizational standpoint—the only publicly owned franchise in the 32-team NFL.”); 
see also Daniel Kaplan, Fight League Going Public in Reverse Merger, STREET & 
SMITH’S SPORTS BUS. J., Sept. 18, 2006, at 6 (referring to the Green Bay Packers as the 
only publicly owned sports club). 
 106 See COZZILLIO ET AL., supra note 11, at 16; Mason, in THE BUSINESS OF SPORTS, 
supra note 4, at 57. 
 107 See N. Am. Soccer League v. NFL, 670 F.2d 1249, 1262 (2d Cir. 1981). 
 108 See infra notes 109–15 and accompanying text. 
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any club may be sold, as well as requiring a vote before any club 
may relocate or disband.109  For example, the MLB Constitution 
states that “[a] Major League Club may withdraw from [MLB] 
only with the approval of three-fourths of all Major League Clubs, 
subject to such terms and conditions as the Commissioner may 
require.”110  According to at least one court opinion, however, 
sports clubs, despite contrary wording in certain league 
agreements, always have the right to secede.111 
In addition to “voluntary exit,” leagues also retain the 
contractual right to terminate a club’s membership involuntarily if 
a club violates an important league rule.  The MLB Constitution, 
for example, includes a separate section pertaining to “involuntary 
termination,” which allows “with the approval of three-fourths of 
all Major League Clubs” for MLB to terminate the membership of 
any other club.112  Pursuant to the MLB Constitution, there are 
twelve types of wrongful conduct that would allow MLB clubs to 
involuntarily terminate another club, including the following 
examples: “allow[ing] gambling of any kind upon its grounds,”113 
“fail[ing] or refus[ing] to comply with any requirement of the 
Commissioner,”114 and “[f]ail[ing] or refus[ing] to fulfill [their] 
contractual obligations.”115 
Given the possibility of clubs involuntarily terminating one 
another, as well as the possibility of clubs seceding, the mixed-
mode system operates very differently from the league-based 
common property system.  Because clubs retain at least a limited 
right to leave the league, as well as a right to require others to 
leave, club interests are not intertwined with one another in any 
complete way. 
 
 109 See, e.g., Jon Morgan, Modell Agrees to Sell Ravens, BALTIMORE SUN, Dec. 20, 
1999, at 1A; MLB CONST., art. V, § 2(b)(2), (3), (8). 
 110 MLB CONST., art. VIII, § 3. 
 111 Chicago Bulls II, 95 F.3d 593, 599 (7th Cir. 1996) (“Yet, the 29 clubs, unlike GM’s 
plants, have the right to secede . . . and rearrange into two or three leagues.”). 
 112 MLB CONST., art. VIII, § 4. 
 113 Id. § 4(c). 
 114 Id. § 4(f). 
 115 Id. § 4(j). 
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IV. ALLOCATING PROPERTY RIGHTS IN THE MIXED-MODE SYSTEM 
Based upon the contractual underpinnings of the mixed-mode 
system, the clubs in this system choose to share certain property 
rights at the league level, while maintaining other property rights 
privately at the club level.116  Sports clubs balance between these 
two interests along five different revenue streams: (1) individual 
gate receipts and other fan-related revenues; (2) corporate 
proceeds; (3) broadcast revenues; (4) licensing/merchandising fees; 
and (5) Internet/new media revenues.117 
A. Mixed-Mode Allocation of Gate Receipts and Other Stadium 
Revenues 
The property right to gate receipts and other fan-related 
revenues (e.g., parking and concession sales) is the right to the 
money fans pay to attend a sporting event.  Mathematically, gate 
receipts are equal to game attendance multiplied by average ticket 
price.118  In today’s economy, gate receipts represent slightly less 
than 40 percent of overall sports league revenues.119 
Historically, gate receipts have been allocated in various ways, 
even within a single league structure.120  For example, when the 
National League was founded in 1876, home clubs retained all of 
 
 116 See Levin et al., in THE BUSINESS OF SPORTS, supra note 4, at 67–68 (discussing the 
sources of revenue). 
 117 LEEDS & VON ALLMEN, supra note 5, at 73 (mentioning all of the revenue streams 
except for Internet/new media). 
 118 Quantitatively the simplest equation for calculating gate revenues is Rg = p*q, where 
Rg represents “gate revenues,” p represents “average price per ticket” and q represents 
“quantity of tickets sold.” Id. at 75.  However, the true cost of “gate receipts” also 
includes the cost of parking. See Bring $12 to Park, or Buy in Advance, STREET & 
SMITH’S SPORTS BUS. J., Apr. 10, 2006, at 22 (discussing the decision of MLB’s Atlanta 
Braves to increase the cost of parking to $12 per car). 
 119 According to Financial World, for the 1996 season, gate receipts on average 
represented 39.93% of a sports clubs’ revenue in the four premier American sports 
leagues. LEEDS & VON ALLMEN, supra note 5, at 74 (citing Michael K. Ozanian, 
Scoreboard Valuation, FINANCIAL WORLD, June 17, 1997 at 46–50).  Meanwhile, more 
recently, a Sports Business Journal article reported that for the 2005 season, MLB clubs 
earned $1.8 billion of their $4.8 billion in revenues from gate receipts (37.5% of total 
revenues). Eric Fisher, MLB Season Preview: Bud Selig Leads MLB’s Revenue Rally, 
STREET & SMITH’S SPORTS BUS. J., Apr. 3, 2006, at 1, 23–27. 
 120 See infra notes 121–27 and accompanying text. 
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their gate receipts as a form of private property.121  A few years 
later, NL clubs agreed to reallocate gate receipts, granting only 70 
percent of these proceeds to the home club, and allocating 30 
percent to the visiting club.122  By 1950, National League clubs 
had again voted to change how it allocated gate receipts, this time 
with the home club’s revenue increased to 86 percent and the 
visiting club’s revenue reduced to 14 percent.123  This approach 
increased the home club’s incentive to attract new fans and 
improve the condition of its ballpark.124  Today, MLB still 
considers gate receipts as a form of local revenue; however, 34 
percent of gate receipts are now shared equally amongst all 
clubs.125 
Other sports leagues have chosen to implement different 
allocations of gate receipts.  The NFL, for example, traditionally 
allocates gate receipts more evenly, with approximately 60 percent 
designated for the home club and approximately 40 percent placed 
in a “visitor’s” pool, which is split equally among all clubs.126  
Meanwhile, the NBA and NHL clubs allocate regular-season gate 
receipts as entirely private property, belonging completely to the 
home club.127 
Although each of the premier American sports leagues allocate 
gate receipts in a somewhat different manner, the way in which 
each of these leagues allocate gate receipts indicates lack of 
 
 121 See generally SCULLY, supra note 33, at 11. 
 122 See id.  With the implementation of revenue sharing of gate receipts, the new gate 
revenue equation for a respective club became: Rg = ά * Rh + (1- ά) * Ra, where Rg 
represents gate revenues, Rh represents average revenue from home games, Ra represents 
average revenue from away games and ά represents the revenue share retained by the 
home club. See LEEDS & VON ALLMEN, supra note 5, at 75. 
 123 See SCULLY, supra note 33, at 11. 
 124 See id. 
 125 See MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL BASIC AGREEMENT, art. XXIV (2003–06) (The 
Revenue Sharing Plan). 
 126 See Mid-South Grizzlies v. NFL, 720 F.2d 772, 776 (3d Cir. 1983); N. Am. Soccer 
League v. NFL, 670 F.2d 1249, 1252 (2d Cir. 1982); LEEDS & VON ALLMEN, supra note 
5, at 80; Lowry, supra note 1, at 111. 
 127 See DOWNWARD & DAWSON, supra note 76, at 48; Mason, in THE BUSINESS OF 
SPORTS, supra note 4, at 57; Sheehan, in THE BUSINESS OF SPORTS, supra note 4, at 48.  
Nevertheless, in both the NBA and NHL, gate receipts from post-season games are 
shared amongst clubs. See John Lombardo, Leagues Cut into Clubs’ Final Revenues, 
STREET & SMITH’S SPORTS BUS. J., June 12, 2006, at 3. 
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“complete unity of interest” amongst clubs in this area of 
operation.128  For example, in the NFL, even though the New York 
Giants football club earns money when consumers attended any 
NFL game, the New York Giants earn even more money when 
consumers attend New York Giants games rather than the games of 
a rival club (for example, the New York Jets, or even a club in a 
different city).129  As a result, even though each sports club has a 
strong interest in promoting the overall league, each club has an 
even greater interest in first promoting itself, even at the expense 
of rival league-members.130 
B. Mixed-Mode Allocation of Corporate Proceeds 
A second stream of sports rights are corporate proceeds.  
Corporate proceeds include local sponsorship agreements 
(including naming rights agreements) and luxury suites. 
1. Local Sponsorship/Naming Rights Agreements 
Local sponsorship and naming rights agreements are long-term 
corporate arrangements under which a sports club promises to 
name either a stadium/arena or a specific part of a stadium/arena 
after a sponsoring company, or where a club agrees to help market 
a particular product more generally.131  Local sponsorship and 
 
 128 Copperweld Corp v. Independent Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 771 (1984). 
 129 For discussion of clubs in the same league competing against one another for gate 
receipts when those clubs are in close proximity to one another, see N. Am. Soccer 
League, 670 F.2d at 1258 (mentioning this competition between NFL clubs for fans at 
least where there are two or more teams located within a home territory) and Mid-South 
Grizzlies, 720 F.2d at 787 (noting that “[c]onceivably within certain geographic 
submarkets two league members compete with one another for ticket buyers.”).  For 
discussion of fans purchasing tickets for a sporting contest located outside of their 
particular geographic region, signaling perhaps a wider competition amongst sports clubs 
for gate receipts, see Growing Pains for Online Ticketing, STREET & SMITH’S SPORTS 
BUS. J., Oct. 29, 2007, at 6 (quoting online ticketing company Paciolan’s CEO Dave 
Butler about the importance of online ticketing options to meet more than just the needs 
of “a very limited geographic area.”). 
 130 See generally Sullivan v. NFL, 34 F.3d 1091, 1098 (1st Cir. 1994) (describing intra-
league competition within finite geographic markets); L.A. Mem’l Coliseum Comm’n v. 
NFL, 726 F.2d 1381, 1390 (9th Cir. 1984) (mentioning independent NFL management 
policies exist at the club level regarding “ticket prices”); Mid-South Grizzlies, 720 F.2d at 
787 (describing intra-league competition within finite geographic markets). 
 131 See generally LEEDS & VON ALLMEN, supra note 5 at 81. 
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naming rights have become especially popular in recent years 
among certain types of companies (banks, utilities and packaged 
goods companies), which seek to build brand equity amongst 
sports fans by associating themselves with a given team.132  While 
minor-league stadium naming rights may sell for as little as $2 
million per year, and simple sponsorship agreements may sell for 
even less,133 the market price for naming rights in premier 
American sports stadiums is substantially higher and rising 
exponentially.134  For example, just four years ago, the most 
lucrative naming rights agreement was the Fed Ex sponsorship 
agreement of the Washington Redskins football stadium, which 
Fed Ex signed for a 29-year period at a price of $200 million ($6.9 
million per year).135  In 2007, however, MLB’s New York Mets 
signed a 20-year $400 million naming rights agreement with 
Citigroup, granting Citigroup naming rights to the New York 
Mets’ new stadium ($20.0 million per year); the NBA’s New 
Jersey Nets signed a similar agreement with the London-based 
financial institution Barklays PLC for naming rights to the Nets’ 
new Brooklyn, NY arena ($20.0 million per year).136 
As with gate receipts, in the context of local sponsorship and 
naming rights agreements, individual clubs lack “complete unity of 
interest.”137  The market for both sponsorships and stadium naming 
rights is national (if not international), and clubs actively compete 
against one another to obtain the most profitable of these 
agreements.138  Because clubs almost always keep as private 
 
 132 See Jon Morgan, Familiar Names Popping Up on Stadiums, THE BALTIMORE SUN, 
Feb. 17, 2003, at 1D. 
 133 Examples of simple sponsorship rights include for example Anheuser-Busch’s 
agreement to sponsor the Arizona Cardinals football stadium, under which Anheuser-
Busch gets permanent electronic signs in the stadium, and Heinz’s agreement where it 
pays to place two 35 foot-long ketchup bottle icons on the scoreboard. See, e.g., Terry 
Lefton, Anheuser-Busch Takes Big Role in Cardinals’ New Football Stadium, STREET & 
SMITH’S SPORTS BUS. J., Mar. 20, 2006, at 9. 
 134 See LEEDS & VON ALLMEN, supra note 5, at 81. 
 135 Id. 
 136 Terry Lefton, CAA Hired to Land Sponsors for the Yankees, STREET & SMITH’S 
SPORTS BUS. J., Oct. 1, 2007, at 1; John Lombardo, Barklays-Nets: A Brand Grows in 
Brooklyn, STREET & SMITH’S SPORTS BUS. J., Jan. 22, 2007, at 1. 
 137 Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 771 (1984). 
 138 See, e.g., Eric Fisher, Mets Ask $10M a Year to Name New Ballpark, STREET & 
SMITH’S SPORTS BUS. J., Apr. 10, 2006, at 4 (discussing how Mets owner Jeff Wilpon 
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property the profit they derive from these agreements, clubs 
compete vigorously, sometimes even against clubs within their 
league.  The competition is especially intense for full 
stadium/arena naming rights because corporations generally do not 
purchase naming rights for more than one stadium/arena. 
2. Luxury Suites 
Luxury suites, meanwhile, provide corporate fans with a 
premium game experience.139  Equipped with food, televisions, 
and premium services, luxury suites allow clubs to receive up-front 
revenues from corporate clients on an annual basis, irrespective of 
the clubs’ on-the-field performance.140  Clubs are increasingly 
demanding that cities provide them with new stadiums/arenas, 
equipped with 50 to 100 luxury suites.141  These suites are in turn 
sold to corporate clients for upwards of $100,000 per season.142  
For example, at San Diego’s PETCO Park, Padres management 
initially sold luxury suites to corporate sponsors at a one-time 
$90,000 membership fee, plus $160,000 in annual rent.143  
Meanwhile, at the Staples Center, which hosts the NBA’s Los 
 
believes that if the Yankees were to sell naming rights, the Mets and Yankees would be 
in competition for sponsors); Don Muret, Naming Rights Shoppers Want to Know Where 
A’s Park Will Be, STREET & SMITH’S SPORTS BUS. J., Oct. 9, 2006, at 14 (explaining that 
the city and exact location of a new ballpark affects how much a corporation is willing to 
pay to put its name on a specific stadium, and implying that individual clubs compete 
with one another to reach naming rights agreements with those major corporations). 
 139 LEEDS & VON ALLMEN, supra note 5, at 81. When a club sells a luxury box, it first 
assigns a gate value to the luxury box ticket and treats that portion of the proceeds as part 
of gate revenues. Id.  After subtracting out the gate value, the remainder value of the 
luxury box ticket is what is considered as the revenues derived from the luxury box. Id. 
 140 See generally id. 
 141 See Edelman, Curb Bargaining Power, supra note 100, at 280–82 (2003).  Cities that 
provide stadiums to clubs, however, sometimes then share the revenue derived from those 
boxes; for example, the New York Mets share 50 percent of the revenue from Shea 
Stadium’s luxury boxes with the city. See Eric Fisher, supra note 138, at 4. 
 142 See John Lombardo, Knicks’ Premium Seats Carry Steepest Price, STREET & 
SMITH’S SPORTS BUS. J., Oct. 29, 2007, at 4 [hereinafter Knicks]; John Lombardo, Pistons 
Selling Newest Suites at Lower Prices, STREET & SMITH’S SPORTS BUS. J., Mar. 6, 2006, 
at 4 [hereinafter Pistons]; Don Muret, AEG Print Ads Tout Staples Premium Seats, 
STREET & SMITH’S SPORTS BUS. J., Oct. 15, 2007, at 5. 
 143 See Jonathan Heller, San Diego Baseball Team Markets Ballpark Luxury, SAN DIEGO 
UNION TRIB., Dec. 13, 2002, available at http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_hb5553/ 
is_200212/ai_n21722523. 
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Angeles Lakers and Los Angeles Clippers, luxury suites sell for an 
annual price of up to $400,000 per year,144 and at Madison Square 
Garden, which hosts the NBA’s New York Knicks and the NHL’s 
New York Rangers, “VIP boxes,” which are similar to luxury 
suites, sell for up to $800,000 per year.145 
Revenues from luxury suites in all four premier American 
sports leagues remain primarily private property, indicating 
interests amongst the clubs to compete against one another in the 
sale of these boxes.146  The competition amongst clubs for luxury 
boxes is very similar to that for gate receipts, except luxury box 
competition is arguably even more intense because individual 
clubs keep all (rather than part) of their luxury suite revenues.147  
This again indicates lack of any “complete unity of interest.”148 
C. Mixed-Mode Allocation of Television/Radio Broadcast 
Revenues 
A third important property right is television/radio broadcast 
revenues.149  On a league-wide basis, television broadcast revenues 
range from as high as $2.4 billion per year in the NFL to 
 
 144 See Don Muret, supra note 142, at 5. 
 145 See Knicks, supra note 142, at 4. 
 146 See COZZILLIO ET AL., supra note, 11 at 13. 
 147 See L.A. Mem’l Coliseum Comm’n v. NFL, 726 F.2d 1381, 1390 (9th Cir. 1984) 
(mentioning independent NFL management policies exist at the club level regarding 
“luxury box seats”); cf. Mid-South Grizzlies v. NFL, 720 F.2d 772, 776 (3d Cir. 1983) 
(discussing competition amongst sports clubs for certain local revenues). 
 148 Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 771 (1984). 
 149 See generally LEEDS & VON ALLMEN, supra note 4, at 77.  Radio broadcast rights 
represent only a small percentage of total broadcast dollars. See PHIL SCHAAF, SPORTS 
MARKETING: IT’S NOT JUST A GAME ANYMORE 203–04 (1995).  Radio broadcast fees, 
which are not addressed further in this article, are usually negotiated on the club level. 
See generally id.  Amongst MLB clubs, the New York Yankees and Boston Red Sox 
have the most lucrative radio agreements, valued at $10–$12 million per year. See Andy 
Grossman, Red Sox Seek MLB’s Largest Radio Rights Deal, STREET & SMITH’S SPORTS 
BUS. J., Mar. 13, 2006, at 7.  But in the NFL, as of 1994, the Chicago Bears had the most 
lucrative radio rights deal at $4.5 million/year. Id. (citation omitted).  In addition, many 
sports clubs are buying radio stations to avoid what they consider unprofitable radio 
deals. See id. at 7; Andy Grossman, Radio Executives Worry Over Trend of Sports Teams 
Buying Stations, STREET & SMITH’S SPORTS BUS. J., Feb. 20, 2006, at 13.  This mimics a 
longer-standing trend amongst a growing number of sports clubs to start their own cable 
television networks. 
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substantially less in other leagues, such as the NHL.150  These 
revenues are composed of both national and local payments.  In 
each of the four premier American sports leagues, local broadcast 
revenues are regarded as private property; whereas, national 
broadcast revenues are held in common and allocated evenly 
amongst the clubs. 
Each of the four premier American sports leagues has adopted 
a different mix between nationally-broadcasted and locally-
available games.  At one extreme, in the NFL, clubs sell all non-
preseason television rights on a collectivized, national basis.151  At 
the other extreme, leagues such as MLB and the NHL permit 
individual clubs to negotiate the sale of most games to local 
networks.152 
In the early days of television, member clubs in each of the 
four premier American leagues were undecided about whether to 
collectivize any broadcast rights, with some large market clubs 
seeming to prefer signing only local television contracts.153  The 
movement in favor of collectivizing at least some television rights 
began with the NBA packaging and selling of broadcast rights.154  
MLB then followed with “Game of the Week,”155 and by 1961 
 
 150 See FORT, supra note 4, at 79–81; LEEDS & VON ALLMEN, supra note 5, at 77; Andy 
Bernstein, Networks Talk Tough on MLB TV Package, STREET & SMITH’S SPORTS BUS. J., 
Apr. 10, 2006, at 3.  On average, the revenue in MLB, the NBA, the NHL and the NFL 
from various media sources surpassed gate revenues in 1997, accounting for 39 percent 
of total club revenues. See Sports Club Valuations, FORBES, Dec. 13, 1998 at 132; see 
also COZZILLIO ET AL., supra note 11, at 11; DOWNWARD & DAWSON, supra note 76, at 
37.  In 2006, total MLB common media revenues, just from national broadcasts, was 
estimated at $814 million, with 51.2% of this national broadcast revenue coming from 
broadcast television contracts and 36.5% coming from a cable television contracts. See 
Eric Fisher, supra note 119, at 1, 23–27. 
 151 DENNIS R. HOWARD & JOHN L. CROMPTON, FINANCING SPORT 401 (2d ed. 2004). 
 152 See FSN Hooks Marlins for All Telecasts, STREET & SMITH’S SPORTS BUS. J., Feb. 
27, 2006, at 7 (stating that the Florida Marlins sell 150 of their 162 baseball games 
through a local contract); see also COZZILLIO ET AL., supra note 11, at 13. 
 153 See Mason, in THE BUSINESS OF SPORTS, supra note 4, at 56. 
 154 SCULLY, supra note 33, at 26; see generally Gary R. Roberts, The Legality of the 
Exclusive Collective Sale of Intellectual Property Rights by Sports Leagues, 3 VA. 
SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 53, 55 (2001). 
 155 Roberts, supra note 153, at 55 (explaining that “except for the one league-sold game 
each week, the individual teams were not precluded from selling rights to all of the other 
games. Thus, there was a pooling of rights for and exclusive collective selling of that one 
weekly game, but the rights sold were not exclusive for all league games”). 
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both the American Football League and the NFL had national 
broadcast contracts.156  Then, in 1964, the NFL agreed to sell its 
pooled broadcast rights to Columbia Broadcast System (“CBS”) in 
a deal that generated over $1,000,000 in revenue per club—more 
money than any club had ever earned by selling its rights 
individually.157 
The economic explanation for why individual clubs earned 
more money from collectively selling broadcast rights is based on 
a “pooling effect,” which means that by pooling broadcasts, 
leagues eliminate interclub competition for broadcast rights, 
driving up the price for television stations to purchase these 
rights.158  Stated otherwise, “[i]n negotiating pooled television 
rights . . . the League was able to keep bidding high for contracts 
with broadcasting and other companies, while eliminating the 
potential for clubs to compete against one another.”159  In doing so, 
some have argued that pooling has even allowed sports clubs to 
compete more effectively for the overall television programming 
dollar.160 
Today, collectively selling at least some sports broadcast rights 
has become the industry standard based on the belief that 
collectivizing certain broadcast rights benefits all clubs, 
irrespective of market size,161 and based on a limited exemption 
from antitrust law for joint conduct in this area, which is known as 
the Sports Broadcasting Act of 1961.162 
 
 156 SCULLY, supra note 33, at 27. 
 157 Mason, in THE BUSINESS OF SPORTS, supra note 4, at 56. 
 158 COZZILLIO ET AL., supra note 11, at 12–13; SCULLY, supra note 33, at 27. 
 159 Mason, in THE BUSINESS OF SPORTS, supra note 4, at 56. 
 160 See, e.g., Chicago Bulls I, 961 F.2d 667, 673 (7th Cir. 1992) (“As the NBA points 
out, sports is a small fraction of all entertainment on TV, and basketball a small fraction 
of sports televising.”). 
 161 See generally LEEDS & VON ALLMEN, supra note 5, at 83–84. But see FORT, supra 
note 4, at 82–83 (noting the one exception might be New York markets where the New 
York Yankees (MLB) slightly out-earned the New York Giants and Jets (NFL) in media 
revenues based on the Yankees’ ability to capitalize on baseball’s structure that allows 
for more local media in the broadcast mix). 
 162 See Sports Broadcasting Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1291 (2000) (“The antitrust laws . . . shall 
not apply to any joint agreement by or among persons engaging in or conducting the 
organized profession team sports . . . by which any league of clubs . . . sells or otherwise 
transfers all or any part of the rights of such league’s member clubs in the sponsored 
telecasting of the games . . . engaged in or conducted by such clubs.”); see also 
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Nevertheless, the divergent interests of individual clubs in 
allocating broadcasting rights has often led to infighting about how 
many games to broadcast on national-versus-local television, as 
well as how to define local broadcast markets.163  Divergent 
interests have even led to issues about whether clubs may extend 
their local broadcast signals into competitor markets.164  For 
example, shortly after the Chicago Bulls basketball club began to 
broadcast their local games on WGN, a super station with 
broadcast signals extending throughout the entire United States, six 
years of litigation ensued between the Bulls and the rest of the 
NBA clubs over the legitimacy of the Bulls’ broadcasting 
practices.165  In this particular context, the Bulls’ interests were 
completely disjointed from those of most NBA clubs, as the Bulls’ 
incentive was to maximize its personal broadcast revenue and 
national fan base; on the other hand, the remaining NBA clubs 
were concerned that the Bulls’ approach would devalue their 
broadcasting revenues and comparative fan bases.166 
 
COZZILLIO ET AL., supra note 11, at 13 (“Congress, through the Sports Broadcasting Act 
of 1961 and 1966, acceded to the NFL’s request and granted certain sports leagues a 
limited antitrust exemption for purposes of negotiating league-wide, across-the-board 
sponsored television broadcasting packages.”); Chicago Bulls I, 961 F.2d at 671 (“The 
Sports Broadcasting Act is special interest legislation, a single-industry exception to a 
law designed for the protection of the public.”). 
 163 See L.A. Mem’l Coliseum Comm’n v. NFL, 726 F.2d 1381, 1390 (9th Cir. 1984) 
(“In certain areas of the country where two teams operate in close proximity, there is also 
competition for . . . local television and local radio revenues.”); Team-By-Team Business 
Previews, STREET & SMITH’S SPORTS BUS. J., Oct. 23, 2006, at 35 (explaining the desire 
of the NBA’s Dallas Mavericks basketball team to broadcast games in competition with 
the NBA’s San Antonio Spurs and Dallas Mavericks). 
 164 See Sullivan v. NFL, 34 F.3d 1091, 1098 (1st Cir. 1994) (finding that NFL clubs 
compete for “local broadcast revenues”). 
 165 See Chicago Bulls II, 95 F.3d 593, 599 (7th Cir. 1996); Chicago Bulls I, 961 F.2d at 
669. 
 166 Chicago Bulls I, 961 F.2d at 669 (explaining that the national broadcast of 30 
Chicago Bulls television games on the WGN superstation “is a boon . . . to the Bulls 
owners . . . [b]ut it is a bane to the other clubs, which would prefer to have fans watch 
their contests rather than tune in the Bulls, who, thanks to Michael Jordan and Scottie 
Pippen . . . are the winningest and most popular team in the NBA.”). 
It is interesting to note that in both Chicago Bulls I and Chicago Bulls II the defendant 
NBA clubs sought to invoke the single entity defense; however, the facts in Chicago 
Bulls I and Chicago Bulls II are almost opposite of Copperweld because the defendants in 
the Chicago Bulls cases alleged that the plaintiff was also part of the single entity.  It is 
entirely nonsensical to conclude that a plaintiff and the defendants in a single lawsuit 
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Further, the different perspectives amongst these clubs were 
not grounded in mere philosophical ideology, but rather were 
based on differences in disparate economic incentives.167  This 
again signals a lack of “complete unity of interest.”168 
D. Mixed-Mode Allocation of Licensing/Merchandising Fees 
Licensing/merchandising fees, the fourth important revenue 
stream, are fees from “reproducing an image, or portion thereof 
[of] any copyrighted property for a fee to the rights holder.”169  
Currently, each of the four premier sports leagues allocate 
licensing/merchandising revenue by collectivizing individual club 
trademark rights into a trust and then licensing those trademark 
rights collectively through separately-formed “properties” arms.170 
In 1963 the NFL became the first collection of sports clubs to 
allocate licensing/merchandising rights in this manner when it 
created NFL Properties as a joint venture to act on behalf of each 
of the individual NFL clubs.171  By creating NFL Properties, the 
NFL now requires that any commercial enterprise, seeking to use 
any, or all, or some of the NFL club trademarks, license these 
trademark rights collectively from NFL Properties, rather than 
individually from specific football clubs.172 
In recent years, licensing trademarks has become big business, 
as the properties arms of MLB, the NBA, the NFL, and the NHL 
 
could combine to form a single entity, given that a party would never seek to sue itself; 
such a ruling “flies in the face of reason.” Village of Key Bicayne v. Tesaurus Holdings, 
Inc., 761 So. 2d 397, 398 (Fla. App. 2000). 
 167 Cf. Mid-South Grizzlies v. NFL, 720 F.2d 772, 776 (3d Cir. 1983) (mentioning 
conceivable competition amongst clubs for certain local broadcast revenues); Eric Fisher, 
Is Liberty Media Right Fit for Braves?, STREET & SMITH’S SPORTS BUS. J., May 1, 2006, 
at 3 (providing one of many examples of media conglomerate ownership of sports clubs). 
 168 Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 771 (1984). 
 169 SCHAAF, supra note 149, at 235. 
 170 See generally id. at 236. 
 171 See American Needle, Inc. v. New Orleans Saints, 496 F. Supp. 2d 941, 942 (N.D. 
Ill. 2007) (decision questionable on its merits); see also Roberts, supra note 153, at 59 
(explaining that the precise legal steps of this transaction involved NFL clubs first 
establishing a subsidiary corporation called “NFL Properties, Inc.,” and then all of the 
NFL member clubs transferring virtually exclusive rights in their trademarks and logos of 
the teams to an “NFL Trust” which NFL Properties managed). 
 172 Roberts, supra note 154, at 59. 
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have generated substantial revenues.173  By operating licensing 
departments collectively, properties arms of sports leagues build 
economies of scale in licensing/merchandising and avoid 
duplication of sales-staff resources.174  Additionally, clubs that 
collectivize their trademarks enjoy a purported increase in profits 
based on the “pooling effect,” because would-be buyers of 
trademark licenses, which include both apparel companies and 
league-wide sponsors, cannot pit one club against another.  
Consequently, clubs are able to better compete to sell licenses 
against other forms of entertainment.175 
Nevertheless, the broad-based practice of collectivizing certain 
licensing/merchandising rights is not firmly entrenched in the 
structure of the mixed-mode system, but rather serves merely as a 
loosely-bound feature of the system.  For example, in the NHL, 
despite clubs sharing equally in the revenues derived from 
licensing club trademarks to apparel manufacturers, the Atlanta 
Thrashers forego about $75,000 annually in private concession-
stand revenue by not allowing their concessionaires to sell licensed 
apparel of rival NHL clubs in their stadium.176  In addition, some 
of the sports’ owners that had purchased their clubs before the 
 
 173 See id. at 59; SCHAAF, supra note 149, at 236 (stating the four premier sports 
merchandise sellers in gross sales dollars are Major League Baseball Properties ($3.5 
billion in gross sales in 1993), NFL Properties ($3.0 billion in gross sales in 1994), NBA 
Properties ($2.5 billion in gross sales in 1993) and NHL Properties ($1.0 billion in gross 
sales in 1993.)). 
 174 See Roberts, supra note 154, at 66 (explaining that collectivized selling of licensing 
rights “[r]elieves each team of the burden of having to employ a staff of people with the 
legal and business expertise to negotiate, draft, and implement [agreements]” and “can be 
done more cheaply and efficiently by a central league staff of such experts with 
substantial experience in this area”). 
 175 See Levin et al., in THE BUSINESS OF SPORTS, supra note 4, at 65 (“Competition for 
the sports entertainment dollar, and for the sport fan’s attention, is increasingly intense.”); 
cf. Broad. Music Inc. v. CBS, Inc., 441 U.S. 1 (1979) (finding cooperation amongst 
competitors in arranging blanket licensing of certain copyrighted songs might be pro-
competitive within the scope of the greater entertainment market). 
 176 See Thrashers Offer to Swap Jerseys, STREET & SMITH’S SPORTS BUS. J., Jan. 30, 
2006, at 30; see also John Lombardo, supra note 127, at 3 (explaining that even though 
licensing rights are shared equally amongst NHL clubs, during the regular season 
individual clubs keep concession revenues as private property, even where these revenues 
involve the resale of licensed jerseys). 
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forming of properties arms periodically attempt to reassert personal 
property rights over their marks.177 
In the past fifteen years, two sports clubs—the NFL’s Dallas 
Cowboys and MLB’s New York Yankees—have litigated against 
the full collectivization of club marks.178  Presumably, at the time 
of conflict, either club could have threatened to leave their 
respective league and reclaim their club marks as entirely private 
property. However, no club could really make good on such a 
threat without a guarantee that other clubs would follow. 
Although both the Cowboys and Yankees eventually settled 
their disputes, in each instance these disputes in-and-of themselves 
amplify the strain of interests, as well as the lack of “complete 
unity,” that persists even in the licensing/merchandising area of 
sports business.179 
E. Mixed-Mode Allocation of Internet/New Media Revenues 
Finally, the newest form of property rights in professional 
sports involves Internet/new media rights, which includes the 
potential right to broadcast sports contests digitally over 
broadband, the right to sell sports-related videos online, and the 
right to control the trade names associated with Internet 
properties.180  The number of American households with 
broadband Internet access has risen from under 10 million in the 
year 2000 to over 70 million today.181  As a result, according to 
 
 177 See COZZILLIO ET AL., supra note 11, at 15 (“Certain team owners may believe that 
they can generate more revenue from local sponsors of their team . . . marks and logos 
than their pro rata share of the revenue generated by an exclusive central league 
marketing organization.”). 
 178 Dallas Cowboys owner Jerry Jones prepared to challenge in court the NFL Trust and 
the NFL’s pooling of all league and team marks and logos as a violation of antitrust laws. 
Id.  George Steinbrenner planned to do the same against MLB. Id. (citation omitted). 
 179 N.F.L. Settles with Cowboys, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 14, 1996, at 32; see also Copperweld 
Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 771 (1984). 
 180 See Eric Fisher, New Site First Step in NHL Digital Makeover, STREET & SMITH’S 
SPORTS BUS. J., Sept. 18, 2006, at 1, 31; John Lombardo & Eric Fisher, NBA Pumps Time, 
Cash into Web, STREET & SMITH’S SPORTS BUS. J., Sept. 25, 2006, at 1, 60; New Media 
Opens Door on New Revenues, STREET & SMITH’S SPORTS BUS. J., May 1, 2006, at 20A 
(Sports Emmy Awards). 
 181 See Predictions: What Lies Ahead on the Sports Media Landscape, STREET & 
SMITH’S SPORTS BUS. J., Mar. 27, 2006, at 40 (Graph: Tracking Growth of Broadband 
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Sean McManus, president of CBS News and Sports, Internet/new 
media revenues are “[t]he fastest growing segment” of sports 
business.182  Specifically, for MLB, this business segment has 
grown from $36 million in revenues in 2001 to an estimated $300 
million in 2006.183 
As with all new forms of property rights, Internet/new media 
rights began in the dominion of individual clubs, with clubs hiring 
their own staff of Internet marketing experts to help build their 
respective brands.184  Recently, however, Internet/new media rights 
have begun to shift to common property.  In 1997, the NBA 
became the first premier American league to shift Internet/new 
media rights out of the realm of private property and into control 
by the commons.185  Three years later, in the year 2000, MLB and 
the NFL each adopted similar Internet/new media policies that 
shifted control over these property rights into the common 
sector.186  Very recently, the NHL attempted to implement a 
similar policy, with clubs voting 25-3 in favor of collectivizing 
Internet/new media rights (with one absence and one 
abstention).187 
Nevertheless, there still is not “complete unity of interest” with 
respect to Internet/new media revenues.  For example, Madison 
 
Households) (also noting the increase in U.S. households that subscribe to the Internet 
from just under 50 million in the year 2000 to over 75 million today). 
 182 New Media, supra note 179. 
 183 See Eric Fisher, supra note 119, at 1, 23–27. 
 184 See supra notes 117–79 and accompanying text; see also Rangers’ David Looks to 
Past to Upgrade Team’s Web Site, STREET & SMITH’S SPORTS BUS. J., Oct. 16, 2006, at 
12. 
 185 WEILER & ROBERTS, supra note 50, at 677. 
 186 Id.; see also Terry Lefton, NFL Taking Internet In-House: With No Big Offer, 
League Thinks Long Term, STREET & SMITH’S SPORTS BUS. J., Oct. 23, 2006, at 1; Terry 
Lefton & Eric Fisher, NFL Takes Time to Study Net Rights, STREET & SMITH’S SPORTS 
BUS. J., May 1, 2006, at 6. 
 187 Defendants’ Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion for 
Preliminary Injunction at 1, Madison Square Garden, L.P. v. NHL, No. 07 Civ. 8455, 
2007 WL 3254421 (S.D.N.Y 2007); see also Sara Stefanini, In Sports, Off-Court Battles 
Range Over League Power, COMPETITION 360, Oct. 26, 2007.  Even before the NHL 
passed this formal policy, the NFL in September 2006 announced a role-out of the new 
NHL.com site, which featured “a deep offering of video content, a sharply heightened 
emphasis on fantasy gaming and social networking, and a constant showcase of 
individual players.” Fisher, supra note 179, at 1, 31. 
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Square Garden LP, the parent company of the New York Rangers, 
recently filed a lawsuit against the NHL, arguing that “by seeking 
to control the competitive [Internet/new media] activities of 
independent businesses in ways that are not necessary to the 
functioning of [the  NHL] joint venture, the NHL has become an 
illegal cartel.”188  The Rangers contended that “MSG today uses 
[the Rangers website] as a competitive tool to generate and 
maintain fan interest in the Rangers in competition with other NHL 
teams.”189 
Although the Rangers were ultimately denied their motion for 
preliminary injunctions on other grounds,190 to the extent that the 
Rangers seek to compete against other hockey clubs to build fan 
interest, there simply, by definition, cannot be “complete unity of 
interest” amongst NFL clubs.191 
 
 188 Complaint for Injunctive Relief at ¶ 6, Madison Square Garden, L.P. v. NHL, No. 07 
Civ. 8455, 2007 WL 3254421 (S.D.N.Y. 2007). 
 189 Id. (emphasis added). 
 190 Madison Square Garden, L.P. v. NHL, No. 07 Civ. 8455 (LAP), 2007 WL 3254421, 
slip op. at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 2, 2007) (finding the claim likely failed under the Rule of 
Reason); cf. Standard Oil Co. v. U.S., 221 U.S. 1, 31 (1911) (explaining that joint 
ventures reviewed under the Rule of Reason are permitted under this standard where their 
pro-competitive benefits outweigh anticompetitive harm); E. THOMAS SULLIVAN & 
JEFFREY L. HARRISON, UNDERSTANDING ANTITRUST LAW AND ITS ECONOMIC 
IMPLICATIONS 150 (3d ed. 1998) (“Because joint ventures have the potential of producing 
benefits as well as costs, courts analyze them under the rule of reason, weighting the 
economic efficiencies against the actual costs of the venture.”); see also id. at § 4.11. 
 191 Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 771 (1984); see also 
Madison Square Garden, L.P., 2007 WL 3254421, slip op. at *8 (finding the NHL 
operates as a “joint venture” and not a single entity).  It is important to note that in 
Madison Square Garden, much as in Chicago Bulls I and Chicago Bulls II, the defending 
league has responded with the nonsensical argument that the club’s suit fails based on the 
“single entity” defense.  As explained above, see supra note 166, the single-entity 
defense, even if otherwise appropriate, simply cannot apply where the plaintiff in a case 
is part of the unit that the defendants argue composes a single entity, because the mere 
fact that one member of the alleged single-entity unit is suing other members in itself 
indicates lack of “complete unity of interest.” Copperweld, 467 U.S. at 771.  A truly 
independent party would never seek to sue itself; such an action “flies in the face of 
reason.”  Village of Key Bicayne v. Tesaurus Holdings, Inc., 761 So. 2d 397, 398 (Fla. 
App. 2000). 
01_EDELMAN_031208_FINAL 3/12/2008  7:11:02 PM 
2008] PROPERTY-RIGHTS THEORY IN PROFESSIONAL SPORTS 925 
 
CONCLUSION 
Over the past twenty years, most American courts have 
correctly concluded that premier American sports leagues are not 
“single entities” because clubs in these leagues maintain too many 
private property rights.192  Although one recent court has 
challenged this notion,193 the overwhelming weight of evidence 
indicates that the refusal to grant a “single entity” exemption to 
premier American sports leagues is well justified.194 
Upon reviewing the economic structure of the four premier 
sports leagues that operate in a mixed-mode system, there is little 
doubt that clubs in these leagues lack “complete unity of interest” 
in each of the following areas: (1) individual gate receipts 
(including other stadium revenues); (2) corporate proceeds; (3) 
broadcast revenues; (4) licensing/merchandising fees; and (5) 
Internet/new media revenues.195  Moreover, when looking at these 
leagues in the gestalt, none of them has anything close to the 
“complete unity of interest” needed to invoke a “single entity” 
defense.196 
Presuming that federal courts continue to properly reject the 
“single-entity” defense in the realm of premier American sports, 
the business practices of each of the premier American sports 
leagues will remain subject to Section One of the Sherman Act, 
just like any other form of business joint venture.  In other words, 
beyond professional sports’ limited antitrust exemptions under the 
Sports Broadcasting Act of 1961197 and the Curt Flood Act of 
 
 192 Copperweld, 467 U.S. at 771. 
 193 See generally American Needle, Inc. v. New Orleans Saints, 496 F.Supp. 2d 941 
(N.D. Ill. 2007). 
 194 Edelman, Single Entity Ruling, supra note 11, at 4, 12. 
 195 Copperweld, 467 U.S. at 771; see also supra notes 117–91 and accompanying text. 
 196 Copperweld, 467 U.S. at 771; see also Sullivan v. NFL, 34 F.3d, 1091, 1099 (1st Cir. 
1994) (“NFL member clubs compete in several ways off the field which itself tends to 
show that the teams pursue diverse interests and thus are not single enterprises under 
§1.”); L.A. Mem’l Coliseum Comm’n v. NFL, 726 F.2d 1381, 1390 (9th Cir. 1984) 
(referencing competition amongst clubs more generally for fan support). 
 197 Sports Broadcasting Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1291 (2000); see also supra note 162 and 
accompanying text. 
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1998,198 premier American sports clubs would be allowed to reach 
agreements with one another only if courts find these agreements 
pro-competitive.199 
Not only does denying the “single entity defense” conform to 
the Supreme Court’s earlier holding in Copperweld, but this 
conclusion is sound public policy.  In recent years, premier 
American sports clubs have become extraordinarily profitable 
based on their unique property rights system.  It would be a twisted 
sense of irony if the unique property-rights system that has made 
professional sports so profitable also were to provide them with a 
loophole to avoid complying with antitrust principles.200 
By rejecting the notion that premier American sports leagues 
are “single entities,” federal courts importantly retain the ability to 
regulate premier American sports clubs under Section One of the 
Sherman Act.  As a result, American consumers remain protected 
 
 198 15 U.S.C. § 26b (2000) (defining the status of baseball’s limited exemption from 
antitrust law).  The Congressional Record underlying the Curt Flood Act explains: 
It is the purpose of this legislation to state that [MLB] players are 
covered under the antitrust laws (i.e., that MLB players will have the 
same rights under the antitrust laws as do other professional athletes, 
e.g., football and basketball players), along with a provision that 
makes it clear that the passage of this Act does not change the 
application of the antitrust laws in any other context or with respect 
to any other person or entity. 
Curt Flood Act of 1998 P.L. 105-297, §2, 112 Stat. 2824 (statement of Rep. Hyde).  For 
further discussion of the Curt Flood Act, as well as the case law underlying baseball’s 
historic antitrust exemption, see Edelman, Minnesota Twins, supra note 42, at 47–54, 59–
62. 
 199 See SULLIVAN & HARRISON, supra note 189, at § 4.11 (explaining the Rule of Reason 
in the context of joint ventures); see also Standard Oil Co. v. U.S., 221 U.S. 1, 31 (1911). 
 200 See N. Am. Soccer League v. NFL, 670 F.2d 1249, 1257–58 (2d Cir. 1982) 
(rejecting the application of the single entity defense by explaining that “[t]o tolerate such 
a loophole would permit league members to escape antitrust responsibility for any 
restraint entered into by them that would benefit their league or enhance their ability to 
compete even though the benefit would be outweighed by its anticompetitive effects. . . . 
The sound and more just procedure is to judge the legality of [restraints amongst sports 
clubs] according to well-recognized standards of our antitrust laws rather than permit 
their exemption on the ground that since they in some measure strengthen the league 
competitively as a ‘single economic entity,’ the combination’s anticompetitive effects 
must be disregarded.”). 
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against the risks of anti-competitive conduct within the 
professional sports industry.201 
 
 201 See SULLIVAN & HARRISON, supra note 189, at § 4.11 (explaining the Rule of Reason 
in the context of joint ventures); see also Standard Oil Co., 221 U.S. at 31; L.A. Mem’l 
Coliseum Comm’n, 726 F.2d at 1390 (“Of course, the singular nature of the NFL will 
need to be accounted for in discussing the reasonableness of the restriction . . . but it is 
not enough to preclude § 1 scrutiny.”); N. Am. Soccer League, 670 F.2d at 1257 
(explaining that denying the single-entity defense requires that sports leagues’ conduct 
undergo review under the Rule of Reason). 
